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1 Introduction
The redistribution of income is one of the primary activities of modern governments. Nearly
every OECD country has a degree of progressiveness in their income tax system (OECD, 2008, p.
112) designed to redistribute income from the better off to the worse off indicating a preference
among the population for redistribution. However, it remains unclear as to why, precisely, such
systems are supported by the populace (Boeri, Börsch-Supan and Tabellini, 2001). Why do
people support redistributive policies?
For net recipients of any redistribution, the answer may seem trivial, as such people mate-
rially benefit. Where the median voter is a net recipient we would expect to see redistributive
policies in place (Meltzer and Richard, 1981) though this condition is not always met. For
example, between 1979 and 2001, less than 45 percent of households in the United Kingdom, a
country with a large and growing welfare state (Browne and Hood, 2012), were net recipients of
redistribution (Bourne, 2012). This suggests that net contributors do not unanimously oppose
redistributive policies. The interesting question is then, why not? Why do net contributors
demand redistribution that imposes a cost on themselves?
Economists have identified a number of possible reasons why net contributors support re-
distributive policies including the demand for insurance, demand for redistribution as a public
good, individual beliefs and social norms. Alesina and Giuliano (2009) note that the empirical
disentanglement of these motives is difficult, albeit not ‘fatally’ so.
In this paper, we address this challenge directly and test for social preferences using data from
outside the lab. Using a newly constructed data set, instrumental variables and a particularity
of the Spanish labour market whereby public sector workers enjoy nearly inviolable job security,
we disentangle the role of insurance from the public goods motive underlying the expressed
preferences of net contributors, i.e. the employed, for public spending on unemployment benefits.
We estimate the effect of individual unemployment risk and of the local unemployment rate on
workers’ declared preferences for redistribution via one instrument: unemployment benefits. We
then decompose that effect into the part explained by risk aversion and demand for insurance
and the part explained by the public good nature of redistribution. Our results suggest that in
this case it is demand for insurance that drives declared preferences for redistribution. We find
no evidence for the public goods motive.
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We focus on unemployment benefits for five reasons. First, as Boadway and Oswald (1983)
argue, ‘casual observation suggests that policy-makers have in mind redistribution of income as
at least one rationale for unemployment insurance’ (p. 195). That is, unemployment benefits
are, at least in part, an instrument for redistributing income.
Second, Kuzienko, Norton, Saez and Stantcheva (2013) argue that demand for general re-
distribution might not be too intense because people are unlikely to be aware of the level and
changes in some more general inequality metric. The level of unemployment, however, is a
clearly visible, often reported and simple to comprehend variable making it more likely that
individuals will recognise any change and respond, assuming that they respond at all.
Third, in the case of unemployment, the instrument (unemployment benefits) and the target
of the redistribution (the unemployed) are inextricably linked making it simpler to analyse the
relationship between the two.
Fourth, unemployment benefits make up a significant amount of social spending. In 2010,
expenditure on unemployment benefits by the 17 Euro area countries was about 6.1 per cent of
total ‘social protection’ expenditure.1
Lastly, while Cowell and Schokkaert (2001) recommend that studies of preferences for redis-
tribution be done in the laboratory and there is indeed a sizable experimental literature in this
area (e.g. Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Durante, Putterman and van der
Weele, 2013; and see Fehr and Schmidt (2006) for a survey). Those studies using survey data
have tended to be based on very general questions about redistribution.2 The constraint on lab
experiments using an artificial setting to study redistributive preferences and studies using sur-
vey questions about redistribution in general is that they are limited in what they can say about
particular redistributive policies and any attempt to make policy recommendations must con-
sider the instrument through which redistribution occurs. As Piketty (1996) notes ‘individuals
1 Based on the authors’ calculations using data obtained from Eurostat
(http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/pls/portal/). The tables used in this calculation are
available from the authors upon request. According to Eurostat the ‘social protection’ expendi-
ture includes eight categories of spending: Sickness/Health care, Disability, Old age, Survivors,
Family/children, Unemployment, Housing and Social exclusion not elsewhere classified.
2 For example, studies using the World Values Survey (Alesina and Giuliano, 2009; Kerr, 2011) tend
to use the question:
“Some people think that the government in Washington should do everything to improve the standard
of living of all poor Americans (they are at point 1 on this card). Other people think it is not the
government’s responsibility, and that each person should take care of himself (they are at point 5).
Where would you place yourself on this scale or haven’t you made up your mind on this?”. The
question in the International Social Survey Programme (used by Corneo and Grüner, 2002) is “It is
the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high
incomes and those with low incomes.’ Respondents can choose among ‘strongly agree’, ‘agree’, ‘neither
agree nor disagree’, ‘disagree’, ‘strongly disagree”’.
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might well share the same “values” as far as distributive justice is concerned, but...they disagree
about the way actual inequality between individuals is generated.’ (p. 8). Such disagreement
is also found in McCall and Kenworthy (2009) who show that while people object to increasing
inequality and support government intervention to address the problem, they disagree about
the appropriate instrument to do so. Thus, the relative importance of different motives under-
lying redistributive preferences may depend on the choice of redistributive instrument under
consideration (Husted, 1990).
The rest of the paper is as follows: in Section 2, we outline a theoretical framework in
which we interpret our results. In Section 3, we describe our data and discuss our identification
strategy. Results are discussed in Section 4 Results are discussed and conclusions are drawn in
Section56.
2 Preferences for redistribution
Economists have identified a number of reasons why net contributors support redistributive
policies. First, demand for insurance may underlie preferences for redistribution. Net contrib-
utors may support redistributive polices in case they themselves become net recipients at some
point. This explanation fits comfortably with standard notions of economic self-interest and
redistribution as insurance has been studied extensively by economists (Barr, 1992; Sinn, 1995;
Wright, 1996; Casamatta, Cremer and Pestieau 2000; Iversen and Soskice 2001; Moene and
Wallerstein, 2001, 2003; De Donder and Hindricks, 2003; Boadway, Leite-Monteiro, Marchand
and Pestieau, 2006; Zweifel, 2013). However, self interest manifested as demand for insurance
is insufficient to fully describe preferences for redistribution (Fong, 2001)
Economists have therefore considered a second component to preferences for redistribution
whereby net contributors derive utility from the welfare of others, directly or indirectly. Reasons
why individuals might derive utility from the welfare of others are manifold. People may be
inequality averse (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), they may be altruistic (Rueda and Pontusson, 2010a)
or their self-interest may be of the ‘enlightened’ variety.3 While each of these characteristics
have distinguishing features and separate, albeit related, development, generally an individual
3 For example, Alesina and Giuliano (2009) note that ‘the level of inequality may affect crime and some
people may be more or less subject to the risk of criminal activities’ (p 1). So net contributors may
be concerned with the level of inequality or the welfare of the poor but only insofar as it reduces the
the exposure of the contributor to crime.
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with any of them can be described as behaving as if their utility is a function of others’ welfare
to some degree.
The presence or absence of such argument in i’s utility function has implications for the
nature of redistribution. Redistribution has long been thought of as a public good. However, its
status as a public good is contingent on the distribution of income, and implicitly the incomes of
other people, entering the utility function (Thurow, 1971; Pauly, 1973; Mankiw, 2010).4 That
is redistribution is a public good if and only if, demand for it is driven by something other than
risk aversion and demand for insurance alone. We therefore consider a ‘public goods’ motive in
addition to the insurance motive.5
A simple model of redistributive preference formation
Our primary interest is in empirically estimating the responsiveness of declared preferences of
workers for unemployment benefit spending to changes in the unemployment rate. To aid in the
interpretation of our results and to give structure to the decomposition of the effect, we outline
a simple theoretical model. We assume a continuum of agents normalised to 1. Of these agents,
share (1−u) will be employed and u will be unemployed and eligible for unemployment benefits
where 0 < u < 1. We are interested in the preferences of the employed agents. All employed
agents earn the same (gross) labour income, y, and consume ce = (1− t)y, where t is a payroll
tax used to fund the unemployment benefit system and 0 < t < 1.6 Unemployed agents receive
benefits, which allows them to consume cu = βy, where β is the replacement rate, 0 ≤ β < (1−t).
That is, the effect of the choice variable, t, on the consumption of the unemployed is realised
via β. A representative agent i derives utility from her own of consumption and we allow her
4 ‘As long as people care about others to some degree, antipoverty programs are a type of public good.’
(Mankiw, 2010, p 296)
5 Preferences may also have a fixed component. For example, individual beliefs have been shown to be
important. Such beliefs likely exhibit a degree of persistence. For example, religious beliefs are found
to be important (Neustadt, 2011) in the formation of redistributive preferences. An individual’s beliefs
about potential socio-economic mobility (Piketty, 1995) and/or the relative roles of ‘luck’ and effort in
determining outcomes (Fong, 2001; Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote, 2001; Alesina and Angeletos, 2005;
Francon and Guillaud, 2011) have also been shown to be predictive of that individual’s preferences
for redistribution. There is evidence that these beliefs are formed early in life, a product of parental
indoctrination (Esping-Andersen, 1999; Alesina and Giuliano, 2009) and the economic conditions one
is raised in (Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2014). While such beliefs can play a role in determining the
level of demand for redistribution via unemployment benefits, our interest is in the responsiveness
of this demand to changes in the level of unemployment, so any fixed component of preferences will
drop out in the derivative. We therefore exclude fixed beliefs from our analysis and focus instead on
the insurance and public goods motives.
6 Until 2009, unemployment benefits were essentially fully funded out of social security contributions,
but since then, due to the severity of the crisis and the high unemployment rate, those contributions
fund about 50% of the unemployment benefit system (TC, 2012). To make up the diffference, the
central government transfers resources - funded out of general taxes. For simplicity, though, we use a
single tax to fund the unemployment benefits system in our model.
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to possibly derive utility from the consumption of unemployed people as well, where θi ≥ 0
captures the degree to which i derives utility from j’s consumption. Note the consumption of
the unemployed as captured by, cju, is non-rivalrous and non-excludable, i.e. a public good.
The timing of the model is as follows. We impose a veil of ignorance (Rawls, 1971) on agents
such that, ex ante, they observe x, know that share u of all agents will be unemployed. The
veil conceals the agents’ ex post employment status, although each knows the probability that
she will be unemployed, pi = pi(xi, u), where xi is a vector of i’s employment characteristics
(e.g. education, occupation, industry of employment and sector of employment), ∂pi/∂u ≥ 0 and
p¯ = u. Ex ante, agents declare their preferred level of redistribution via unemployment benefits,
t∗i , given xi, u and thus pi.7 While this set-up is highly artificial it provides an analogue to the
situation where workers have a preferred level of benefits spending in the face of uncertainty
about their continued employment and the prevailing level of unemployment.
The expected utility of agent i is:
E[Ui] ≡ (1− pi)U(cie) + piU(ciu) + θiU˜(cju) (1)
where there first term is the utility i derives from her own consumption if she is employed, the
second term is the utility i derives from consumption if she is unemployed and the third term
is the utility i derives from the consumption of others when they are unemployed.
The budget constraint of the unemployment benefit system is:
ty(1− u) = βyu (2)
Rearranging yields
1− u
u
t = β (3)
where ∂cu/∂t > 0 and ∂cu/∂u < 0.8 That is, β varies with t and u to ensure the budget constraint
7 We are interested in the declared preferences of workers and do not consider a political equilibrium
though a simple approach would be for each agent reveals t∗i at which point the veil is lifted, each
agents’ unemployment status is revealed and the realised t = t¯∗.
8 Changes in β occur in practice as budget constraints becomes binding. For example, before July 2012
β = 0.7 in Spain. At that time the Spanish government enacted a law such that the replacement rate
remained at 70% only for the first six months of being unemployed, but from then on decreased from
60% till 50% (up to a maximum of 24 months). This constituted a change in β resulting from increased
u and falling tax revenue (t remained constant). See http://www.fedeablogs.net/economia/?p=23617.
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holds with equality.9
Substituting Equation 3 into Equation 1 and maximising it with respect to t yield the FOC:
t∗i :
Marginal benefit
1−u
u
[
piU
′
u + θiU˜ ′u
]
=
Marginal cost
(1− pi)U ′e
(4)
where primes stand for partial derivatives of a single variable; and assume utility is an increasing,
concave function of consumption such that, U ′′(.) < 0 < U ′(.).10 We assume that the marginal
utility from i’s own consumption when unemployed, U ′u, is at least as large as the marginal
utility i derives from j’s consumption when j is unemployed, i.e. U ′u ≥ U˜ ′u > 0.
We the totally differentiate Equation 4 with respect to u, and substitute the FOC into it,
yielding:
dt∗i
du
= t
∗
i
u
{
(1− u)εipi,u
[
U ′u + θiU˜ ′u
]
+ piU ′u [RAi − 1] + θiU˜ ′u [IAi − 1]
(1− u) [(piU ′uRA+ θiU˜ ′uIA]
}
≥ 0 (5)
where εipi,u ≡ ∂pi∂u upi ≥ 0 is the sensitivity of i’s own probability of employment to changes
in u, RA ≡ −U ′′uU ′u c
i
u ≥ 0 is a measure of relative ‘risk aversion’ à la Arrow-Pratt (Arrow, 1965)
and, similarly, IA ≡ − U˜ ′′u
U˜ ′u
cju ≥ 0 accounts for i’s ‘inequality aversion’ (Atkinson, 1970). Note
that the sign of Equation 5 is unambiguously non-negative when IA > 1 and RA > 1 (Meyer
and Meyer, 2005).
The first two terms in the numerator
(
(1− u)εipi,u
[
U ′u + θiU˜ ′u
]
+ piU ′u [RA− 1]
)
capture the
insurance motive. Given an increase in u, i is more likely to be unemployed, and consume cu,
leading to a higher t∗i . The more risk averse i is, the greater her demand for insurance. The
last term
(
θiU˜
′
u [IA− 1]
)
describes the public goods motive. This motive is a function of the
degree to which i is public goods orientated, θi, and her inequality aversion (i.e., the larger the
increase in i’s marginal utility from changes to cju, again due to the binding budget constraint
of the system).
Our aim is to empirically estimate an analogue of dt
∗
i
du and to decompose the result into an
insurance and a public goods component. Such a decomposition requires one of the motives to
be held constant. The degree to which agents are public goods orientated (θi) is unobservable.
9 Moene and Wallerstein (2001) develops a more sophisticated model in which both t and β can be
chosen and a political equilibrium is obtained.
10 Note that fixed beliefs about t∗ could be introduced here in the form of a constant on the left hand
side, but, as noted above, we exclude fixed beliefs from the model for the sake of simplicity as their
inclusion here would not change the predictions of the model we are interested in.
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Our strategy therefore is to control for the risk of unemployment, pi, and thus the insurance
motive. To do so we exploit an institutional feature of the Spanish labour market.
In Spain public workers can hold civil servant status. These workers, known as funcionarios,
formed three-quarters of the public sector work force in 200411 and their appointments are, by
definition, life-long.12 Other public sector workers on contracts (personal laboral) also enjoy
a high degree of job security (Sanchez-Motos, 2007). This institutionalized job security can be
used to hold the insurance motive underlying preferences for redistribution via unemployment
benefits, as these workers face almost no risk of unemployment, p ≈ 1 and εp,u ≈ 013. Then, we
can consider two cases from the above framework:
These workers face a positive probability of becoming unemployed, pi > 0 and this probability
is a function of exogenous economic conditions, i.e. the unemployment rate, so εipi,u < 0. As we
cannot observe θi, if we estimated dt
∗
du
∣∣∣
private
> 0, we would not be able to conclude anything
about the underlying motives. As suggested above, to disentangle the motives we must hold
one of them constant. We do this by considering the case of public sector workers.
These workers have no reason to demand redistribution as insurance as they cannot lose
their job. Therefore, if we estimate a positive value of dt∗du , then we would conclude that there is
a public goods motive, i.e. θi > 0, present in i’s utility function. Conversely, if dt
∗
du
∣∣∣
public
= 0, it
would be consistent with the absence of a public goods motive, θi = 0, a conclusion that could
be generalised to all workers provided θ|public ≥ θ|private. We discuss this final point in detail
below.
11 According to 2013 data released by the Boletín Estadística del Personal al servicio de las Adminis-
traciones Públicas, they account for 64% of public workers.
12 Although de iure funcionarios can be fired for insufficient performance (article 63, of the Law 7/2007,
April 12th, Basic Statute of the Public Worker), de facto this is extremely rare (Sanchez-Motos, 2007).
13 We also present empirical evidence on this below
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3 Data and estimation
3.1 Data
We use survey and administrative data from Spain. Spain is an ideal setting for our study as
unemployment benefits are homogenous across the country, labour mobility is low (Bentolila and
Jimeno, 1998) and unemployment benefits are tied directly to a particular tax in the form of
social security contributions. In Spain, Social Security contributions are collected from earned
income and this revenue must be used to fund unemployment benefits.14 This direct link
arguably makes the cost of increasing unemployment benefits more salient as it would require
an increase in Social Security tax.
Information on individuals’ declared preferences for public spending, including on unem-
ployment benefits, as well as individual level socio-economic characteristics are taken from the
2006-2010 waves of the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológica (CIS) survey. This annual survey
in Spain is based on a nationally representative repeated cross section of 2,500 individuals and
focuses on subjective perceptions of the tax system and publicly provided goods and services.
Our interest is primarily in the expressed preferences for spending on unemployment benefits
by employed respondents, 50.4% of the full sample. Respondents who are retired, studying,
unemployed or out of the labour force are excluded from the main analysis.
In addition to the socio-economic characteristics, we observe the municipality of residence
for each individual in the sample.15 We add information at the municipal level including unem-
ployment rates, home ownership rates, population, mean income for municipalities with at least
1,000 residents covering 98% of the population (detailed data are not available for the smaller
municipalities). We also add information on crimes at the provincial level as these are not
available at the municipal level. These data are collected from La Caixa and from the Instituto
Nacional de Estatística (INE) in Spain. Comparable data are not available for Navarra and Pais
Vasco and so these Autonomous Communities (ACs) are excluded from the analysis. We are
left with a sample of 4,751 workers residing in 661 municipalities.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for worker-level and municipal-level variables by sector
14 Though as noted above unemployment benefits can be funded by general taxes as well
15 Spain has three levels on sub-national administration. There are 17 Autonomous Communities (anal-
ogous to US sates) which nest 50 provinces (analogous to US counties) which nest 8,119 municipalities.
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of employment.
In Panel A we present the descriptive statistics for the workers and in Panel B we present
these for the municipal-level data. In column (1) we present the means and standard deviations
(in brackets) for private sector workers and in column (2) we present the same for public sector
workers. The final column shows the results of a t-test for the difference in the means with
standard errors in brackets.
The first variable in Panel A of Table 1 (Prefers more UB) is our dependent variable. This
dummy is based on a survey question on respondents’ feeling about the current level of spending
on unemployment benefits. The question allows for five possible (mutually exclusive) responses:
‘too much’, ‘too little’, ‘just the right amount’, ‘unsure’ and refusal to answer.16 We have
excluded those who are unsure or refuse to answer.
We define our dependent variable as equal to 1 if the respondent says ‘too little’ is spent on
unemployment benefits and 0 otherwise. We take it as given that this means that they would
prefer more money to be spent on unemployment benefits. We assume that respondents are
aware of the mechanism through which unemployment benefits are funded (note that respon-
dents are reminded that greater expenditure is funded via taxation), that is we assume that
respondents know that there is no costless increase in public spending.
The second variable in Panel A, ‘unemployment risk’, is an estimate of each worker’s prob-
ability of transitioning to unemployment based on their labour market characteristics. It is, in
effect, an estimate of a workers idiosyncratic risk of unemployment; pi, defined in Section 2,
independent of the unemployment rate. To obtain this, we use the CIS sample of employed
individuals (those in Table 1) plus the sample of individuals who are unemployed but previ-
ously had worked (i.e. those eligible for benefits or who left their job wilfully, but not retired
people) as we observe the characteristics for current jobs (if employed) and for previous jobs (if
unemployed). Using this sample we can estimate
pi = w′iω + ηi (6)
16 In Spanish, the survey question reads as follows: “Como Ud. sabe, el Estado destina el dinero que en
España pagamos en impuestos a financiar los servicios públicos y prestaciones de las que venimos
hablando. Dígame, por favor, si cree que el Estado dedica demasiados, los justos o muy pocos recursos
a cada uno de los servicios que le voy a mencionar”. In English: “As you know, the state spends
the money that we pay in taxes in Spain to finance public services and benefits about which we are
speaking. Tell me, please, if you think the state spends too much, the right amount or too little on
each of the services we will mention.” One of the several publicly provided goods and services that is
asked about is unemployment benefits.
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where pi is a dummy variable equal to 1 if i is currently unemployed and 0 if i is employed, w
is a vector of i’s employment characteristics including occupation17, industry of employment18
and level of education all interacted with the sector of employment and year effects, ω is a vector
of parameters to be estimated and ηi is a well-behaved error term. We estimate Equation 6 via
a probit and the predicted probabilities, p̂i, constitute the ‘unemployment risk’ variable.
The probability of a public sector worker transitioning to unemployment is positive (p¯publici =
0.08), but it is less than half that faced by private sector workers (p¯privatei = 0.19). Note
that not all public sector workers will have funcionario status and thus lifetime employment.
Importantly, the ‘unemployment risk’ for those in the public sector does not vary with the
unemployment rate. Figure 1 plots the mean annual estimated unemployment risk for the
public and private sectors and the official Spanish unemployment rate over time.
As the economy fell into recession and unemployment rose, the risk of transitioning to un-
employment from a private sector job increased while that risk remained relatively constant
for those in the public sector. The risk of becoming unemployed while working in the public
sector is not only much lower, but is also not sensitive to changes in the unemployment rate,
i.e. εpi,u ≈ 0.
As for the other individual-level characteristics (Panel A, Table 1), public sector workers are
three years older, less likely to be male and more likely to be a household’s primary earner.
Public sector are more likely to have post-secondary education and less likely to have less than
secondary education. Public sector workers are also more likely to identify themselves as left-
leaning politically.
In Panel B of Table 1 we consider the characteristics of the municipalities where the public
and private sector workers reside. The first variable in Panel B is the municipal unemployment
rate, our regressor of interest. On average, private sector workers live in municipalities with
slightly lower (half a percentage point) rates of unemployment. Otherwise public and private
sector workers do not live in systematically different municipalities, at least as measured by the
characteristics presented here. Note that no measure of individual or household income, shown
to be important determinant of redistributive preferences (e.g. Alesina and Giuliano, 2009), is
reported in the CIS, so we use mean municipal income, obtained from tax records, as a proxy
for household income (more on this below).
17 Based on the 1979 National Classification of Occupations
18 Based on the two-digit National Classification of Economic Activities.
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The final variable in Panel B is the municipal home ownership rate which provides us with an
instrument to aid identification of our model (discussed in detail below). Unfortunately, these
rates are available only from census data in 2001 and 2011. We predict the homeownership
rates in the intervening years regressing the homeownership rates from the two years we do
observe them on the number of homes in each municipality annually, the log of total provincial
mortgages (in Euros) annually and provincial fixed effects.19
3.2 Estimation
Our analysis aims to determine to what degree changes in the municipal unemployment rate are
driving changes in expressed preferences for spending on unemployment benefits, other things
being equal. To do so, we specify the following model of preferences for redistribution via
unemployment benefits:
dikt = x
′
iktβ1 +m
′
ktβ2 + β3ukt + eikt (7)
where dikt is the binary indicator for worker i in municipality k at time t which equals 1 if
that worker believes ‘too little’ is spent on unemployment benefits, xikt is a vector of worker
characteristics (age, gender, estimated ‘unemployment risk’, religion, presence of children in the
household, marital status and whether or not the individual is household’s primary earner) and
β1 is the corresponding vector of coefficients to be estimated, mkt is a vector of municipality
k’s characteristics at time t (log population, log crimes (provincial), the log number of foreign
residents, the home ownership rate and the log mean income), β2 is the corresponding vector
of coefficients to be estimated, ukt is the unemployment rate in municipality k at time t, β3
is the impact of the local unemployment rate on preferences for unemployment benefits where
sign (β3) = sign (∂t∗/∂u) and eikt is an error term.
OLS estimation of Equation 7 and the interpretation of the results is complicated by four
factors: the presence of fixed effects, possible geographical sorting by workers, potential omitted
variable bias caused by unobserved income at the individual level and possible sorting into
sectors on unobservables.
19 The results from the regression used to obtain these predicted values is presented in the Appendix
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There may be systematic regional differences in redistributive preferences. For example,
regional social norms have been found to be important in the formation of redistributive prefer-
ences (Kuhn, 2011). If these norms vary across regions, then we must control for them. To do so
we include AC fixed effects. We also include year fixed effects to control common shocks. This
aids the identification of the effect of the unemployment rate rather than the effect of general
macroeconomic changes that would correlate with the local unemployment rate.
Workers possibly sort themselves geographically according to their level of human capital.
Those with larger endowments of human capital are more mobile than others (Stambøl, 2003)
and may migrate towards the areas with better job opportunities, i.e. lower unemployment, such
that ∂Human capital∂unemployment < 0. Such individuals, those with more education for example, have generally
been found to prefer less redistribution (Alesina and Giuliano, 2009) so ∂redistribution∂Human capital < 0. As
a result, OLS estimates of β3 may be biased upwards. However, while such sorting may be
a concern in theory, we note above that internal labour mobility in Spain is in fact very low.
Nevertheless, such sorting is possible and must be appropriately considered.
A further bias may result from the fact that we do not observe i′s income. Income is
a key variable in determining demand for redistribution in Meltzer–Richard model, though
empirical results have been mixed. Some find little evidence of income forming redistributive
preferences (Fong, 2001; Corneo and Grüner, 2002) while others (Alesina and Giuliano, 2009)
find that it is important. By the Meltzer–Richard model, we expect ∂redistribution∂income < 0. We
further expect a negative relationship between individual income and local unemployment rate
∂income
∂unemployment < 0, as higher rates of unemployment will exert downward pressure on wages
(Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994). Therefore OLS estimates of β3 may be positively biased. This
bias may be mitigated by the fact that we do control for a number of individual characteristics
correlated with income, such as age, education, sector of employment, occupation and industry
of employment (via p̂w) as well as the mean income in each municipality.
We consider the fourth potential problem, sorting into sectors, below.
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Instrumenting the unemployment rate
We address the potential bias of our estimate arising from omitted variables by using two-
stage least squares (2SLS) instrumental variable estimation. To use 2SLS correctly we need
an instrument which is both relevant (correlated with the local unemployment rate) and valid
(uncorrelated with eijt).
We find such an instrument in Oswald (1996) and Blanchflower and Oswald (2013) who
show that there is a significant relationship between the home ownership rate in time t − s
and the unemployment rate in time t. The evidence for the relationship comes from both inter
and intra-national data. The authors outline a number of possible channels through which this
effect might operate (e.g. increased rigidities in the labour market, decreased investment in
infrastructure due to NIMBY20-ism).
The use of home ownership rates as an instrument requires that the home ownership rates
in t− s do not affect an individual’s declared preference for unemployment benefit spending at
time t, i.e. orthogonal to eijt. This exclusion restriction appears to be rather plausible to us
particularly as we control for the rate of home ownership in each municipality in time t.
Under this exclusion we can express the first and second stage 2SLS equations as
First Stage
Ukt = x
′
iktα1 +m
′
ktα2 + α3OWNERSHIP RATEkt−3 + νikt (8)
Second stage (main equation)
dikt = x
′
iktβ˜1 +m
′
ktβ˜2 + β˜3Uˆkt + µikt (9)
where, OWNERSHIP RATEkt−3 is the home ownership rate in municipality k in time
t− 3, Uˆkt are the predicted unemployment rates from the first stage and β˜ is the 2SLS estimate
of β. We use the three period lag as this is the shortest lag Blanchflower and Oswald (2013)
find to be consistently significant.
20 Not In My Back Yard.
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Selection into sectors
The empirical disentanglement of the motives underlying preferences for unemployment benefits
requires us to estimate our model separately for those working in the private and public sectors.
Workers may sort into those sectors based on relevant unobservable characteristics such as the
degree to which they are concerned with redistribution as a public good (θ). Such selection
would lead to a bias that may not be expunged via the 2SLS approach outlined above. As we
are not able to model selection into the sectors explicitly for lack of an identifying instrument,
we must carefully consider the direction of the possible selection biases.
The existing evidence on the relative ‘pro-socialness’ of public and private sector workers is
mixed. Some studies have found public sector workers to be more ‘pro-social’ than private sector
workers (Houston, 2000; Banuri and Keefer, 2013) which seems consistent with greater concern
for redistribution as a public good, i.e. θPublic > θPrivate. Tonin and Vlassopoulos (2014),
however, find no difference in pro-sociality between sectors, i.e. θPublic = θPrivate. We have no
direct measure of θ in our data, though public sector workers are more likely to self-identify as
politically left-leaning, the end of the political spectrum traditionally associated with greater
support for redistribution (Alesina and Giuliano, 2009).
Given the existing evidence, we assume θPublic ≥ θPrivate so that selection into the public
sector produces a positive bias in estimates of βpublic3 and selection into the private sector
produces a negative bias in estimates of βprivate3 . Thus our estimates of β
public
3 can be seen as
an upper bound and of βprivate3 as a lower bound.
4 Results
We present our main results in Table 2, estimating the model using employed individuals. In
column (1) we present the results obtained from estimating the model for all workers using OLS
and in column (2) using 2SLS. For public sector workers we present the OLS and 2SLS results
in columns (3) and (4), respectively, and for private sector workers in columns (5) and (6),
respectively.
Bootstrapped standard errors (150 replications, clustered at the municipal level) are used
14
as we include variables that are predicted from first stage regressions (unemployment risk and
home ownership). Results for the individual and municipal controls and full first stage results
are presented in the Appendix.
We first consider all workers taken together. The results in column (1) indicate that those
workers at greater ‘unemployment risk’ are more likely to prefer more spending on unemployment
benefits. Mean municipal income is negatively related to preferences for more redistribution.
The coefficient on the municipal unemployment rate is positive and statistically significant.
However, as noted above, this estimate may be subject to bias.
In column (2) we estimate the same model using 2SLS. A first-stage F -test returns a test
statistic of 35.73 (p-value=0.000) indicating that the instrument is relevant. We also test for-
mally for the exogeneity of the municipal unemployment rate via a Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH)
test (see Davidson and MacKinnon (1993), pp 241-242). We fail to reject the null hypothesis
(p-value=0.991) that any endogeneity in the regressors does not have detrimental effects on the
OLS estimator, i.e. OLS is consistent. The 2SLS results are extremely similar to the OLS results
though the 2SLS result is statistically insignificant, the result of inflated standard errors rather
than the diminished magnitude of the estimated effect.21
The estimated effect of the unemployment rate in column (1) suggests that preferences
of workers for redistribution via unemployment benefits do indeed respond to changes in the
level of unemployment. This result is consistent with the findings in Kerr (2011) that ‘growth
in inequality is met with greater concern over inequality, greater support for government-led
redistribution to the poor, and greater support for more-progressive taxation’ (p. 2). The
estimated coefficient of 0.974 in column (1) indicates that 1 standard deviation increase in the
municipal unemployment rate will lead to a 3.6 percentage point increase in the probability
that employed residents will prefer increased spending on unemployment benefits, on average
and ceteris paribus. This is similar in magnitude to the effect of being male (β = −0.041∗∗∗),
not reported the Table 2.
To disentangle the insurance and public goods motivations underlying this effect, we estimate
the model for private sector workers and public sector workers, who have no insurance motive,
separately.
21 We also estimated the 2SLS models using the three-year lagged log of total provincial mortgages as
the instrument as we observe this in each year. The results were not materially different using this
approach and are available from the authors. .
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In column (3) we present the OLS estimates for public sector workers. Changes in the ‘un-
employment risk’ have no effect for public sector workers most likely because workers in the
Spanish public sector tend to enjoy virtually inviolable job security, thus limiting the effect of
working in a more vulnerable industry/occupation or having less education. As noted above,
this job security also eliminates the insurance motive underlying the expressed preferences for
unemployment benefits spending. The OLS estimate of the effect of the unemployment rate is
-0.270 and is statistically insignificant at conventional levels. This result is further supported
by the 2SLS estimates in column (4) where the estimated coefficient is not only statistically in-
significant (note the inflated standard errors) but becomes slightly more negative. The direction
of the bias is consistent with that resulting from selection into the public sector by those who
have higher θ’s, i.e. are more pro-social. The diagnostics from the 2SLS estimation (1st stage
F -test and DWH) indicate that the instrument is again relevant and that OLS is consistent.
OLS estimates for those in the private sector are presented in column (5). We find a positive
and statistically significant effect of the risk of unemployment. We also find a negative effect of
income. The OLS estimate of the effect of unemployment is positive and well defined, indicating
that for private sector workers, higher levels of unemployment lead to increased support for
unemployment benefit spending. The 2SLS results, column (6), again support this result as the
coefficient on the unemployment rate increases, though is statistically insignificant, again due
to inflated standard error. The direction of the bias is again consistent with that resulting from
selection into the private sector by those who are less risk averse and/or have lower θ. The
2SLS diagnostic tests again suggest the instrument is relevant, satisfaction of the orthogonality
condition is supported and that OLS is consistent.
Does the type of unemployment matter?
We further the analysis by distinguishing between the effects of structural and cyclical unem-
ployment. The type of unemployment may matter for two reasons. First, the public goods
motive may only be a function of cyclical unemployment. Alesina and Angeletos (2005) find
that views about the relative importance of ‘luck’ and ‘effort’ in determining outcomes matter
in the formation of redistributive preferences. In our application it may be that the structurally
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unemployed are viewed as being unemployed due to lack of effort whereas those that are cycli-
cally unemployed may be seen as victims of the vagaries of the labour market, i.e. bad luck. It
is conceivable that the public good in this instance is the welfare of those suffering misfortune
rather than all unemployed people and thus the public goods motive may only be a function of
cyclical unemployment.
Second, the nature of unemployment benefits may depend on the nature of the unemploy-
ment. For those who are persistently, structurally unemployed, unemployment benefits are
purely redistributive. If workers are responsive to varying levels of structural unemployment,
it would be suggestive of a public goods motive. The impact of cyclical shocks on redistribu-
tive preferences conflate the insurance and public goods motives. If workers respond to cyclical
shocks it may be due the changes in the income distribution that they wish to ameliorate or
it may be due to changes in the risk that they themselves become unemployed. Demand for
insurance may be a function of cyclical rather than structural unemployment.
We therefore look to estimate the effects of structural and cyclical unemployment by speci-
fying the following model:
dijt = x
′
ijtβ1 +m
′
jtβ2 + β3Ujt + β4U¯t + eijt (10)
which is the same as Equation 7 with the additional regressor U¯t which is the time mean of
the unemployment rate in each municipality. We interpret β3 in equation 10 as the impact
of cyclical unemployment and β4 as the impact of structural unemployment rate on expressed
preferences. Results are presented in Table 3.
The results for all workers (column (1)) suggest that the estimated effect of the unemploy-
ment rate on declared preferences for unemployment benefits spending is driven entirely by
cyclical changes in the local unemployment rate. For public sector workers (column (2)) neither
cyclical nor structural unemployment are significant suggesting that the public goods motive
is not a function of either. For private sector workers (column (3)), the impact of cyclical un-
employment is positive and significant and the impact of structural unemployment is negative
and insignificant. Thus the insurance motive is a function of cyclical unemployment but not
structural. While our theoretical framework does not distinguish between cyclical and struc-
tural unemployment, the intuition is that changes in the demand for insurance must be driven
by shocks in labour market conditions, rather than any persistent rate of unemployment.
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A placebo test
It may be the case that private sector workers favour increased public spending in an effort to
stimulate economic growth and thus improve their job prospects and reduce the risk that they
become unemployed. In this case the change in declared preferences for increased spending on
unemployment benefits would not necessarily reflect an increase in the demand for insurance,
but rather than increased demand for public spending in general.
To test this we conduct a placebo test allowing us to consider the possibility that in times of
recession, and thus higher unemployment, individuals prefer more public spending on all public
services, not just unemployment benefits. The CIS survey asks respondents for their view not
only on unemployment benefits spending but also on a number of other public goods. We model
preferences for spending on each of these. We generate a series of dummies which take a value of
one if the respondent thinks ‘too little’ is spent on four other publicly provided goods/services:
education, justice, health and security. We then replace our primary dependent variable with
these dummies and re-estimate the model. Results are presented in Table 4.
The impact of the unemployment rate on expressed preferences for the public provision
of these other goods/services is insignificant in each case.22 These results suggest that we
are measuring a particular relationship between the unemployment rate and preferences for
unemployment benefits and not a more general relationship between the state of the economy
and preferences for public expenditure.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
The redistribution of wealth is one of the primary activities of the public sector, controversial
though it may be. The services provided by the state are rarely apportioned according to the
amount of tax paid by an individual. The reasons why people demand such redistribution even
when they are net payers into the system is not fully understood. In this paper we have set out to
22 We also estimated these models for public sector workers. The effect is negative for Education and
Justice but only significant at the 10% level. It is insignificant for Health and Security
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test the motivations underlying individuals’ expressed preferences for one form of redistribution,
unemployment benefits, and explore the extent to which such redistribution is a public good.
Unemployment rates and demand for unemployment benefits provide a very good opportunity to
study the relationship between distribution and demand for redistribution. Both unemployment
and unemployment benefits are clearly defined and readily measurable. Moreover, the benefit
(transfers to the unemployed) and the need (unemployment) are directly linked to one another.
This is not necessarily the case for other forms of redistribution. Poverty reduction, for example,
can be addressed via a number of policy instruments making it more difficult to draw a direct
link between benefit and need.
In Table 1 we saw that about two-fifths of all workers would prefer to increase spending on
unemployment benefits. The question we address is what underlies this preference? We set out
to disentangle the insurance and the public goods motives. To do so we use data on workers in
Spain, a country with an institution of near inviolable job security for public sector workers.
When considering all workers taken together we find that those facing greater idiosyncratic
job insecurity are more likely to prefer increased spending on unemployment benefits. We also
find a positive and significant relationship between the local unemployment rate and the pre-
ferred level of unemployment benefits spending. This suggests that preferences for redistribution
do indeed respond to changes in the actual distribution of interest but does little to reveal the
motivations underlying these preferences which we disentangle by estimating the model for
public and private sector workers separately.
For public sector workers we are able to hold the insurance motive constant as the probability
that they transition to unemployment, while not strictly 0, is not a function of the unemployment
rate. If the preferences of public sector workers are responsive to changes in the unemployment
rate, it would be due to demand for redistribution as a public good rather than by demand for
insurance. Our results suggest that the preferences of public sector workers for unemployment
spending are not a function of either their idiosyncratic risk of unemployment nor of local
unemployment rates. While the absence of evidence in favour of a public goods motive may not,
in this case, constitute compelling evidence of its absence, our result is consistent with absence
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of a public goods motive.23
When we estimate the model for private sector workers there is a positive effect of both the
idiosyncratic unemployment risk and of the unemployment rate on preferences for unemployment
benefits spending. Under the condition that public sector workers are at least as public goods
orientated (‘pro-social’) as private sector workers, we can interpret this result, in conjunction
with the absent effect for the public sector workers, as evidence of an insurance motive underlying
preferences for redistribution via unemployment benefits. We find additional support for this
finding when we consider varying effects of cyclical versus structural unemployment.
We have shown that changes in the local rate of unemployment have a significant and econom-
ically relevant effect on workers’ expressed preferences for spending on unemployment benefits.
We attempt to empirically disentangle the roles of fixed beliefs, demand for insurance and a
public goods motive in forming preferences for redistribution. We outline a descriptive theoret-
ical framework in which demand for redistribution is driven by three separate motives: beliefs,
insurance and public goods. Workers may demand more generous unemployment benefits as a
form of insurance against their own unemployment. Workers may also demand more generous
unemployment benefits due to the potential public goods nature of redistribution. The existence
of this last motivation is particularly important as it reveals information about how redistribu-
tion as a good is consumed by individuals. From an economic point of view, it is important to
know whether individual preferences for redistribution via unemployment benefits incorporate a
public goods component as failure to account for such motives may lead to an ‘under-provision’
of redistribution. The absence of such a motive has implications for the conception of redistribu-
tion as a public good (Thurow, 1971; Pauly, 1973; Ashworth et al., 2002; Dorsch and Graham,
2009). Therefore the identification of the motive underlying redistributive preferences is more
than an academic exercise but can have policy implications as well.
It is important to note that while the results are consistent with the dominance of the
insurance motive in determining preferences for redistribution via unemployment benefits, we
cannot readily generalise to all redistributive instruments. It may be true that individuals
view unemployment benefits as a type of insurance with little or no public goods component.
23 That public sector workers express a preference for any unemployment benefits spending at all, though
not responding to changes in local unemployment, suggests that some form of ‘fixed beliefs’ or social
norms underlie their redistributive preferences. Unfortunately, we cannot say to what extent these
beliefs represent some for of altruism, adherence to social norms, beliefs about the relative importance
of luck and effort or about social mobility. This second-order decomposition is beyond the scope of
the current paper.
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This does not mean that all forms of redistribution are viewed as equal and that public goods
motivations do not drive demand for other forms of redistribution (e.g. food stamps, progressive
income tax, social housing). That the evidence presented here suggests the absence of a public
goods motive in preferences for redistribution and in light of the fact that there is evidence
in favour of a public goods motive, in some form, underlying preferences for redistributive in
general (e.g. Corneo and Grüner, 2002) suggests that future work may focus on study formation
of redistributive preferences with respect to particular instruments rather than preferences for
redistribution in general.
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Appendix
First-stage results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
First-stage results
Log total mortgages 0.065***
(0.013)
Log municipal homes -0.016***
(0.006)
Primary earner -0.001 -0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Catholic 0.001 0.001 0.001*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Married -0.000 -0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Children under 23 0.002*** 0.001 0.002***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Log age -0.002* -0.000 -0.002*
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
Male 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Politically Left 0.000 -0.002 0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Unemployment Unemployment risk 0.008 0.013 0.005
(0.005) (0.012) (0.006)
Log income -0.001 0.003 -0.001
(0.002) (0.004) (0.001)
Log municipal pop. 0.002** 0.002** 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log foreign residents 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log provincial crimess 0.003*** 0.002 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log municipal area -0.002* -0.003* -0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Home ownership (t-3) 0.974*** 0.880*** 1.002***
(0.164) (0.190) (0.175)
Observations 92 4751 907 3844
R2 0.751 0.101 0.117 0.098
Municipal controls No Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls No Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes
AC FE No Yes Yes Yes
Provincial FE Yes No No No
Note: In column (1) we present the results from the model used to predict home ownership rates. In columns (2)-(4) we
present the first-stage results from our instrumental variable estimation. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal
level. Stars indicate statistical significance according to the following schedule: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Individual characteristics
Sector
Private Public Difference
Prefers more UBd 0.422 0.346 0.076***
(0.494) (0.476) (0.018)
Unemployment risk (p̂w) 0.185 0.079 0.106***
(0.087) (0.075) (0.003)
Catholicd 0.681 0.677 0.004
(0.466) (0.468) (0.017)
Marriedd 0.546 0.579 -0.033
(0.498) (0.494) (0.018)
Child under 23d 0.443 0.459 -0.015
(0.497) (0.499) (0.018)
Age 38.454 41.279 -2.825***
(11.384) (10.961) (0.418)
Maled 0.592 0.509 0.083***
(0.491) (0.500) (0.018)
Primary earnerd 0.672 0.725 -0.054**
(0.470) (0.447) (0.017)
High school onlyd 0.363 0.287 0.077***
(0.481) (0.452) (0.018)
Post-High schoold 0.214 0.537 -0.323***
(0.410) (0.499) (0.016)
Politically leftistd 0.230 0.283 -0.053***
(0.420) (0.452) (0.016)
Panel B: Municipal characteristics
Municipal unemployment 0.089 0.094 -0.005***
(0.037) (0.038) (0.001)
Population 479.687 491.446 -11.760
(931.746) (928.067) (34.331)
Foreign residents 785.898 787.032 -1.135
(632.901) (555.099) (22.846)
Provincial crimes (‘000) 84.728 84.976 -0.248
(114.790) (112.895) (4.213)
Mean income (€‘000) 17.700 17.511 0.189
(5.812) (5.806) (0.214)
Home ownership rate 0.823 0.819 0.003
(0.066) (0.063) (0.002)
Workers 3844 907
Notes: The superscript (d) indicates that the variable is a dummy. The bracketed values are standard deviations in
the first two columns and the standard error of the difference between the means in the third column. Stars indicate
statistical significant difference between the mean value for the private sector and for the public sector according to the
following schedule: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%.
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Figure 1: Unemployment and unemployment risk (p̂w) over time
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Notes: The ‘unemployment risk’ variable is not directly comparable to the unemployment rate as the ‘unemployment
risk’ for the public and private sectors is the probability that a worker in either sector becomes unemployed. The official
unemployment rate is obtained from the INE.
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Table 2: Baseline results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All workers Public Sector Private Sector
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Unemployment risk (pˆw) 0.520*** 0.451*** 0.326 0.331 0.530*** 0.529***
(0.082) (0.097) (0.223) (0.236) (0.115) (0.126)
Log income -0.035 -0.035 -0.002 -0.001 -0.038* -0.037
(0.025) (0.026) (0.057) (0.075) (0.020) (0.024)
Municipal Unemployment 0.974** 1.156 -0.270 -0.593 1.299*** 1.824
(0.441) (2.080) (0.882) (5.088) (0.461) (2.108)
Workers 4751 4751 907 907 3844 3844
R2 0.042 0.017 0.067 0.028 0.040 0.014
First Stage of 2SLS
Home ownershipt−3 0.975*** 0.881*** 1.000***
(0.163) (0.177) (0.192)
1st stage F-test 35.416 21.498 32.748
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Durbin-Wu-Hausman 0.008 0.005 0.066
p-value 0.931 0.943 0.797
First stage R2 0.056 0.064 0.056
Workers 4,751 4,751 907 907 3,844 3,844
R2 0.039 0.017 0.067 0.028 0.038 0.013
Municipal controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
AC FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable in the main equation is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent say ‘too little’ is spent
on unemployent benefits and 0 otherwise. All regressors in the main stage (main equation) include in the first stage.
Bootstrapped standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the municipal level. Stars indicate statistical significance
according to the following schedule: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%.
Table 3: Cyclical and structural unemployment
(1) (2) (3)
All workers Public Sector Private Sector
Unemployment risk 0.520*** 0.328 0.530***
(0.083) (0.235) (0.112)
Cyclical Unemployment 1.202 -0.079 1.493**
(0.735) (1.340) (0.742)
Structural unemployment -0.267 -0.264 -0.219
(0.643) (1.193) (0.607)
Workers 4751 907 3844
R2 0.042 0.067 0.040
Municipal controls Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
AC FE Yes Yes Yes
Note: All estimates obtained via OLS. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent believes ‘too
little’ is spent on each publicly provided good/service, in turn, and 0 otherwise. Standard errors are clustered at the
municipal level. Stars indicate statistical significance according to the following schedule: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%.
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Table 4: Placebo tests
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Social Police Infrastructure
Private Public Private Public Private Public
Municipal unemployment 0.233 -0.271 0.636 0.683 0.590* 0.413
(0.433) (0.829) (0.494) (0.830) (0.306) (0.590)
Workers 3657 882 3750 889 3818 902
R2 0.046 0.078 0.052 0.076 0.034 0.061
Municipal controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
AC FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: The number of observations varies as we condition inclusion in these models on being included in the sample used
in our primary estimation in Table to ensure we are starting with the same base sample and then exclude those who are
unsure or refuse to answer in each case. All estimates obtained via OLS using private sector workers. The dependent
variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent believes ‘too little’ is spent on each publicly provided good/service,
in turn, and 0 otherwise. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level. Stars indicate statistical significance
according to the following schedule: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%.
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